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PRIVATE PROSECUTION
Robinson v. Lorillard demonstrates at least two important princi-
ples regarding the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
First, it shows the vigor with which the courts will attack the system that
shows the signs of perpetuating discrimination. Secondly, it reveals that
the costs of this necessary effort are very high.
LEE A. PATTERSON, II
Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly
Since the days of our Constitution's infancy, traditional judicial
truisms have been superseded by the viable doctrines of "due process,"
"equal protection," and "judicial fairness." Notwithstanding this evolu-
tion, there remain seemingly impregnable citadels of judicial tradition.
One such remnant of the past is the policy allowing private prosecution
in criminal actions. Recently in State v. Best,' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court reiterated 2 its stand condoning the practice.
I. BACKGROUND AND STATE OF LAW
At common law criminal prosecution adhered to the pure form of
the adversary system; each aggrieved party retained his own counsel to
prosecute his private interest. The private prosecutor had the case laid
before the grand jury and took charge of the trial before the petit jury.3
Despite statutory provisions requiring a public prosecutorial system4
and judicial repudiation of the procedure in some jurisdictions5 private
prosecution remains well entrenched.6
While adhering to the philosophy of the common law rule, the
North Carolina courts have modified its application. Whereas the clas-
1280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
2See, e.g., State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971); State v. Lippard, 223 N.C.
167, 25 S.E.2d 594 (1943); State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 183 S.E. 898, cert. denied, 298 U.S.
682 (1936); State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737 (1932).
3State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 410, 183 S.E. 898, 902, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
See generally 42 AM. JUR. Prosecuting Attorneys § 10 (1942).
'E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (Supp. 1971).
5E.g., McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W. 741 (1911); Bird v. State, 77 Wis. 276,45 N.W.
1126 (1890); Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
$E.g., Handley v. State, 214 Ala. 172, 106 So. 692, 694-95 (1925); Robinson v. State, 69 Fla.
521, 68 So. 649 (1915); State v. Bartlett, 105 Md. 212, 74 A. 18 (1909); State v. Westbrook, 279
N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971).
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sic interpretation precluded any challenge to the private prosecutor,7
North Carolina courts have reserved the final determination for the
discretion of the trial judge8 but have intimated that the practice is not
to be interferred with in the absence of a showing of abuse.' As justifica-
tion for retaining the practice it has been tersely stated that it has
"existed in our courts from their incipiency."'"
Decisions in other jurisdictions reflect diverse judicial attitudes
ranging from agreement with the common law view" to abolishment of
the practice.' 2 Various jurisdictions condition allowance of the proce-
dure on the approval of the prosecutor, 13 the state, or the court."9
Language in some decisions espouses the public duty to carry out such
prosecutions." Indeed, in the face of a statute that banned private prose-
cutors, one court ruled that the definition of "private prosecutor" did
not include an attorney hired by the complaining witness to prosecute. 7
On the other side of the spectrum it has been ruled in cases involving
prosecuting for contingent fees that prosecuting for the private purse of
the solicitor in such cases is abhorrent to the sense of justice. 8 Another
court 9 construed a statute providing for publicly financed solicitors" as
precluding private prosecution because of its inherent private motiva-
tion. Similarly, numerous cases forbid a prosecutor to appear in any
capacity where he is financially backed or is appointed by any private
interest.2' Rulings on challenges to the private prosecutor appearing
before the grand jury overwhelmingly hold that prejudice to the defen-
dant is too damaging to be tolerated22 because the prosecutor's position
'See generally 42 AM. JUR. Prosecuting Attorneys § 10 (1942).
'State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 26, 164 S.E. 737, 744 (1932).
'State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 411, 183 S.E. 898, 902, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
"State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 416, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972). See also State v. Lippard, 223 N.C.
167, 171, 25 S.E.2d 594, 597 (1943).
"Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. 204, 1 Duv. 207 (1864).
"Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
3State v. Bartlett, 105 Me. 212, 74 A. 18 (1909).
"Handley v. State, 214 Ala. 176, 106 So. 692, 694-95 (1925).
'"State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 63 (1895).
"Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 So. 649 (1915).
"Warren v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 448, 94 S.W.2d 430 (1935).
"Bacca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 190 P. 730 (1920).
"McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W. 741 (1911).
2 North Carolina has a similar statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (Supp. 1971).
21E.g., Bird v. State, 77 Wis. 276,45 N.W. 1126 (1890); Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W.
244 (1888).
21Nicholas v. State, 17 Ga. App. 873, 87 S.E. 817 (1916); Wilson v. State, 70 Miss. 595, 13
So. 225 (1893); Flege v. State, 93 Neb. 610, 142 N.W. 276 (1913); Hartgraves v. State, 5 Okla.
Crim. 266, 114 P. 343 (1911).
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as an officer of the court demands a degree of impartiality unlikely in
the private prosecutorial setting. Those decisions abolishing or severely
restricting private prosecution have generally based their determinations
on the contemporary judicial philosophy recognizing its almost com-
plete morphasis since the concept of private prosecution emerged.
II. CONFLICT IN ROLES
Perhaps the one area which has changed most drastically since the
inception of the doctrine permitting private prosecutors has been the
role of the public prosecutor. From his sole function as procured advo-
cate for a prosecution, the duties of the public prosecutor have taken
on new dimensions. He is not an advocate in the ordinary sense of the
word, but is the people's representative, and his primary duty is not to
convict but to see that justice is done.23 The prosecutor is an officer of
the state who should have no private interest in the prosecution and who
is charged with seeing that the criminal laws of the state are honestly
and impartially administered, unprejudiced by any motives of private
gainY.2 It is his duty to show the whole transaction as it was, regardless
of whether it tends to establish a defendant's guilt or innocence.25
Conversely, a privately retained attorney owes his client individual
allegiance, and once employed he must not act for an interest even
slightly26 adverse to that of his client in the same general matterY.2
Therefore, in view of the ethical28 and judicial29 restrictions imposed on
the public prosecutor and the generally recognized loyalties of the pri-
vate advocate, "private prosecutor" is a contradiction in terms. The
high standard of impartiality demanded of a prosecutor realistically
cannot be expected of the private advocate."0
2Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); NCSB CANONS OF ETHICS No. 5.
2'Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
"McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W. 741 (1911). See generally 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 1081 (1961).
2 Parker v. Parker, 99 Ala. 239, 13 So. 520 (1893).
2People v. Hanson, 290 Il1. 370, 371, 125 N.E. 268, 270 (1919); People v. Gerald, 265 II1.
448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914).
2"NCSB CANONS OF ETHICS No. 5; see NCSB CANONS OF ETHICS Nos. 13, C.
"Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
-"The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which can never be pro-
moted by the conviction of the innocent. His object, like that of the court, should be
simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional success
• . . [even though] counsel employed by outside parties . . . would not feel bound by
any such rule of conduct. He appears as private counsel simply, to represent the wishes,
1972] 1173
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Besides the conceptual anomaly in the conflicting roles and loyal-
ties of the two types of prosecutors, the practical consequences of a
private advocate in today's prosecutorial role results in intolerable prej-
udices. Unlike their common law counterparts, modern prosecutors
wield the power of the state's investigatory force, decide whom to indict
and prosecute, negotiate the state's position in plea bargaining, and,
because of their supposed impartiality as officers of the court, are influ-
ential in recommending punishment to the court.
In the normal private prosecutorial setting, the prosecutor remains
in charge. Where the private advocate only observes the proceedings
from indictment to completion of trial, arguably his presence exposes
the defendant to minimal prejudice. However, since the private prosecu-
tor's influence is not confined to the open courtroom, in which obvious
prejudice could be more easily detected by the court, all stages of the
judicial process must be considered in determining whether the mere
presence of the private prosecutor is intollerably prejudicial. The follow-
ing illustrations of the possible consequences of allowing a private prose-
cutor demonstrates the prejudice. Because of the varying degrees of
control relinquished by the prosecutor, the following discussion by no
means illustrates the actual situation in any given case, but it does
indicate that the practice is fraught with possible prejudice.
One prosecutorial power that, if imprudently employed, could re-
sult in dire consequences to those suspected of a crime is the discretion-
ary authority to decide when to prosecute. At this initial stage of the
criminal proceeding, the private advocate is unlikely to play any normal
role. However, though the public prosecutor decides whether to prose-
cute, possibly his decision may be influenced by the pressure of a pri-
vately retained attorney.
The solicitor's discretionary power to prosecute is restricted in fed-
eral criminal actions by the fifth amendment requirement that all prose-
cutions for infamous crimes be commenced by grand jury indictment.
The function of the grand jury is to stand between the accusor and
accused and determine whether a charge is well founded or possibly
whether it is a result of malice or ill will." However, the fifth amend-
ment requirement of grand jury indictment does not apply to states
indictments, which may be served on the formal charge of the prosecu-
prejudice, and animosities of this clients; to secure a conviction at all hazards.
McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 74, 132 N.W. 741, 745 (1911).
3
'Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
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tor.32 In this setting, a private prosecutor could, in those cases where
the public prosecutor abdicated to the private attorney, use the discre-
tion of his position at the whim of his client. Likewise, where the private
prosecutor also represents a client in a civil suit arising from the same
situation, the indictment power could be used as a lever to procure or
enhance a financial settlement in the civil action. The reverse of this
blackmail situation may be as damaging. For example, a private advo-
cate retained by parties sympathetic to the defendant's plight could
move for dismissal, fail to prosecute, or emasculate the indictment
through plea bargaining.
Closely related to the power of the prosecutor to indict and prose-
cute is his discretionary use of the nolle prosequi.3 Though officially
in the province of the court, the employment of nolle prosequi and
capias is normally left to the discretion of the solicitor.34 Prejudices
inherent in the exercise of such discretion when the possessor of it owes
his loyalty to a private party seeking a conviction are repugnant to our
system of justice and could lead to prolonged harassment. 35 The prac-
tice of plea bargaining is well established in the criminal process. Re-
cently the United States Supreme Court indicated that plea bargaining
is not inherently incompatible with a reasonable judicial standard and
that the courts should not interfere unless there has been prosecutorial
overreaching.36 Because the allegiance owed by a private prosecutor
to a possibly vengeful client must coexist with the impartiality de-
manded in the role of solicitor, a fair termination of any plea bargaining
based on the equities of the situation is highly unlikely. The public
solicitor who is in control of the plea bargaining is less likely to be fair
if he is assisted and counseled by a private advocate. If the private
prosecutor is given control of the plea bargaining, the interest of his
client might override those of the public in determining whether a plea
"
2Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1864).
3A nolle prosequi is merely a declaration on the part of the solicitor that he will not
prosecute the suit further at this time. It is not an acquittal, although its effect is to discharge the
defendant without delay. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 74 S.E. 740 (1912). However, the
defendant may be arrested and tried again. State v. Faggart, 170 N.C. 737, 87 S.E. 31 (1915); State
v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 40 S.E. 1 (1901); State v. Thornton, 35 N.C. 256 (1852).
31State v. Moody, 9 N.C. 529 (1873); State v. Buchanan, 23 N.C. 59 (1840); State v.
Thompson, 10 N.C. 613 (1825).
-Coupled with the prosecutor's discretionary power t'o prosecute, this device could be em-
ployed to blackmail an accused.
3Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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to a lesser crime 7 should be accepted.
With the development of the concept of the public prosecutor as
an unbiased officer of the court has evolved the influence on the bench
of the prosecutor's recommendations for punishment. A solicitor is
under a duty to weigh all the mitigating and exculpatory circumstances
in arriving at a fair recommendation. Such a duty would be meaningless
if the private prosecutor, intent on conviction, possessed the responsibil-
ity.
Perhaps the most important power of the prosecutor is his discre-
tion to choose what evidence is submitted to the court.38 Through the
evidence-collecting machinery available to prosecutors such as police
investigatory agencies, the prosecutor uncovers both exculpating and
inculpating evidence, which may not be discoverable by the defense
despite an array of Supreme Court decisions that have proscribed the
suppression of evidence which would exonerate the defendant. Not-
withstanding the court's admonishments, the prosecution still deter-
mines which evidence is exonerating and which is not. This discretion
of the prosecution to determine initially what constitutes discoverable
evidence should not be.tainted with self-dealing.
Finally, at least some jurymen have confidence that the obligations
imposed on the prosecutor will be faithfully observed. Consequently,
improper suggestions and insinuations from the prosecutor are apt to
carry much weight against the accused." Notwithstanding the presence
3'The duty incumbent upon the office of prosecutor to ask for a verdict for a lesser offense
-hen the facts and circumstances warrant presents a similar problem in the private prosecutorial
sctting 'ce State v. Josey, 112 S.C. 20, 99 S.E. 768 (1919). Again there is a discrepancy between
!h- duty of a public prosecutor and that of a private advocate.
38At common law, the state was under little duty to disclose to the defense any information
concerning the defendant's case. For a more complete description of the common lIw tradition,
see People ex rel. Lemorr v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
39The common law approach to prosecution's immunity from defense discovery has been
diluted somewhat by the application of the fourteenth amendment to certain prosecution tactics.
The prosecution cannot intentionally use perjured testimony against the defendant at trial. Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111 (1935). See also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The state is
under a duty to correct perjured testimony when presented. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . .
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." In addition, Court has strongly intimated that the
prosecution is under a duty to initiate disclosure of evidence of the defense if the evidence will
exonerate the defendant. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
"
tBerger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). There has also been concern about the appear-




of the private prosecutor, in most situations arising during the criminal
proceeding the public solicitor or the court is in a position to avoid any
resulting prejudice. This is not true, however, in the situation in which
the private advocate examines a witness, addresses the jury, or argues
to the bench. On such occasions, the harm is inflicted the instant an
unwarranted implication or vituperation is released. Likewise, in some
instances the mere presence of a private prosecutor is likely to bolster
any inference of the guilt of the defendant in the minds of the jury, since
the jury probably would ascribe more credence to a prosecuting witness
who had invested heavily in the prosecution
III. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The fourteenth amendment due process clause is viewed as incorpo-
rating traditional notations of fundamental fairness implicit in the con-
cept of liberty;4 it is a mandate to the states to afford the defendant the
fundamental fairness essential to the concept of justice.42 To determine
if a defendant has been deprived of due process by a particular practice,
the crucial question is whether the practice inherently is so prejudicial
as to infringe the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.4 3
As applied to the private prosecution situation, the constitutional
question depends on whether a procedure that demands impartiality on
the part of the prosecutor becomes impermissably tainted when substan-
tial private influence is interposed. The question is easily answered in
the negative when the public prosecutor remains in complete control of
'the litigation and his decisions are unaffected by the presence of the
private prosecutor. The answer should be different once the private
prosecutor, who is paid to obtain a conviction, actually assumes any
degree of influence, because his inherently biased suggestions and ac-
tions may compromise a crucial and effectively dispositive exercise of
"Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
42Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 136 (1947). The
emphasis is upon basic fairness, not upon compliance with the Bill of Rights, and a state procedure
may be held to violate due process even though its operation is not contrary to any specific
guarantees of the first eight amendments. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUT-
SHELL 7 (1971). This "federalism" theory, though subordinated to the "selective incorporation"
theory several years ago has recently re-surfaced in the Supreme Court's opinions. Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117-43,(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
43Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring, interpreting the majority
opinion).
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prosecutorial discretion." Moreover, the difficulty in determining
whether in specific cases the private prosecutor has actually prejudiced
the defendant militates toward a ruling that private prosecutors should
be banned in all cases, especially since the countervailing state interest
in continuing the practice is miniscule. Arguably, any process which
subjects the accused to the abuses inherent in the questioned method of
trial deprives him of the fundamental fairness required by the due pro-
cess clause.
IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout the history of judicial review of private prosecution in
North Carolina the ethical question of the propriety of private prosecu-
tion has been overlooked." Though related to and often commingled
with the conflict-in-roles consideraitons previously discussed, ethical
decisions dealing with prosecutors have been less confined to the sub-
stantive structures of the past. The North Carolina State Bar has im-
posed a high moral obligation on the solicitor to seek justice at the
expense of being denied convictions." Moreover, both the Council of the
North Carolina State Bar and the General Assembly have attempted to
segregate the public solicitor from all private influences." This philoso-
phy has been followed to the extent of declaring it unethical for an
attorney who shares office space or expenses with any judge, assistant
judge, solicitor, assistant solicitor, or substitute solicitor to practice law
in a criminal court of such officer48 or for any attorney who is or has
been such an officer to accept professional employment in any case
growing out of any matter connected with his office during his incum-
bency.49 These strict ethical standards result from the realization by the
Council of the frailty of all men and of the adverse effect on public
opinion of such associations regardless of whether actual prejudice in
the courtroom results." However, because of inconsistent opinions in
"See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
"
5See cases cited note 2 supra.
'
6NCSB CANONS OF ETHICS No. 5.
'
TNCSB CANONS OF ETHICS Nos. 5, B, B-I, C. The need for citation to Ethics Opinions which
restrict the solicitors private practice of law has been alleviated by the abolishment of such practice
by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (Supp. 1971).
1"NCSB CANONS OF ETHICS No. B-I; see, e.g., NCSB COUNCIL, ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 675
(1969); id. No. 623 (1968); id. No. 606 (1968); id. No. 588 (1967).
IINCSB CANONS OF ETHICS No. C; see, e.g. NCSB COUN6L, ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 689
(1969); id. No. 665 (1969); id. No. 628 (1968); id. No. 555 (1967).
5
"Such a practice on the part of a court officer in accepting such employment would
[Vol. 501178
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areas tantamount to private prosecution, such as where a city attorney
criminally prosecutes a city employee, the Council's ethical stand on the
issue is less than clear.51 These inconsistencies are evidenced by the
cumulative impact of the opinions which reveal that while the Council
acknowledges that private prosecutors are proper it prohibits solicitors
from accepting private fees.52 It remains anomalous that the Council
expects "clean hands" of the solicitor but accepts privately financed
prosecution .53
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the inherent discrepancies in roles in both the philosoph-
ical and practical application, the possible ethical compromises, and the
questionable constitutional legitimacy, the private prosecution should
be abolished. 4 In the event a party can demonstrate that a particular
prosecution is inadequate in a certain situation, the North Carolina
General Statutes provide adequate means of alleviating the problem by
the appointment of a temporary assistant to the public prosecution. This
system avoids the prejudices resulting from private prosecution and
results in the appointment of attorneys who prosecute in the state's
interest and only for compensation by the state.
JOHN A.J. WARD
have the appearance of evil whether or not evil grows out of the practice and the
solicitors. . . should not permit themselves to become next friends through the influence
of attorneys practicing in their courts.
It is human frailty to return favors and consciously or unconsciously favors received
often times influence one's conduct ....
NCSB COUNCIL, ETHICs OPINIONS, No. 454 (1964).
51See NCSB COUNCIL, ETHICS OPINIoNS, No. 595 (1967); id. No. 254 (1959); id. No. 234
(1958); id. No. 142 (1954); id. No. 103 (1953).52NCSB COUNCIL, ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 470 (1965); id. No. 250 (1958).
53Of notable significance is the fact that although the Council has issued in excess of 735
decisions, only seven have mentioned private prosecution. In addition, the Council has neither
justified its confirmation of the practice nor addressed itself squarely to the issue.
5
n Best, the North Carolina Supreme Court accurately pointed out that the legislature has
provided for the appointment of a full-time solicitor to prosecute in the name of the state and to
be compensated by the state, and for the appointment of temporary assistants when the dockets
are crowded. However, the court concluded that since the statute did not specifically prohibit
private prosecution, the practice was allowable. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
However, it could be argued that since the statute established the office of public solicitor, re-
stricted his compensation and loyalties, and provided for the appointment of assistants by a
disinterested court in case of emergencies, the legislature intended to exclude the intrusion of
private interests.
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